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1. Introduction
Coordination games with heterogeneity in information and complementarity in ac-
tion have been widely applied to macroeconomic environments, financial markets and
even collective actions. In this paper, we study a scenario, where agents that play such
a coordination game have only limited capacity to process relevant information. Con-
sequently, they have to allocate their capacity optimally among various information
sources and then take actions based on the information they acquire. As Sims (2005)
argue, this information processing constraint may have significant welfare implica-
tions for understanding the effects of policies that reveal public information and can
be critical when evaluating the optimality of policies, e.g., the transparency of public
announcements.1
To abstract from a specific market structure and retain tractability, we formalize
our model in a “beauty contest” framework, as in Morris and Shin (2002), where the
payoff for an individual depends on the distance of his action from an unobservable
state and from the average action. To take the best action, agents must estimate the
underlying state and forecast the average action of others. There are two correlated
signals that reveal noisy information about the fundamental, and they can be observed
if agents pay attention to them. One of the signals is private and contains idiosyncratic
noise, and the other is public, can be potentially observed by all agents and contains
common noise. The main point of departure of our model is to assume that agents can-
not perfectly observe these signals because they possess a limited capacity to process
information. Consequently, agents can only observe these signals with idiosyncratic
observation noises.
This setting has captured the essence of several important macroeconomic envi-
ronments and financial markets. For example, consider a price setting model with mo-
nopolistic competition in an informationally segregated island economy. Firms want
to minimize the distance between their price and a target price that is the weighted av-
erage of an unknown state (e.g., log of nominal output) and the aggregate price. The
representative firm on each island has access to public information about the nominal
output (e.g., the central bank’s guidance) and some island-specific information (e.g.,
local forecast). They can extract information about the state of the economy through
those public and local sources, both of which reveal noisy information about the ag-
gregate state, and are relevant for forecasting the aggregate price level. Constrained by
a limited amount of capacity, firms need to decide on the allocation of their attention
to process each of the noisy signals.
1Sims (2005) argues that “rational inattention may have far-reaching implications for macroeco-
nomics and monetary policy generally, once its implications are fully worked out. In the meantime,
though, it may shed some light on transparency in monetary policy.”
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Another case in point is institutional investors in financial markets. They typically
have access to information from a public source, e.g., announcements by the central
bank or annual reports released by the firms whose securities are traded, and informa-
tion from private sources, e.g., research reports on macro conditions or specific firms
provided by analysts in research departments. Both types of sources reveal noisy in-
formation about the market fundamental. Investors need to allocate their limited at-
tention optimally so that they can estimate the true fundamental and the aggregate
action before making decisions.
Questions naturally arise. How do individuals allocate their attention between
these two information sources? Under what conditions, do multiple equilibria emerge?
Does social welfare necessarily increase when individuals possess more information-
processing capacity?
In this model, a number of forces interact and shape agents’ decisions: decreasing
returns to attention, the relative accuracy of the public signal to the private signal, the
coordination motive and the correlation between the two signals.2 It is more attrac-
tive for agents to observe the signal with higher accuracy, because a signal of higher
quality helps agents estimate the state more accurately. However, the force of dimin-
ishing returns to attention provides agents with incentives to diversify their attention
and spend their capacity on both signals.3 The coordination motive tilts the attention
allocation decision toward the public signal, which better aligns their actions. Further-
more, a higher correlation across signals dampens the effect of diminishing returns to
attention and amplifies the effect of the coordination motive.
The four factors combined may lead to the fact that agents allocate their attention
in a non-monotone fashion, i.e., attention paid onto each signal may not necessarily
increase in the total amount of capacity. For example, one intriguing scenario may
arise, where agents can first focus on the relatively more precise private signal and
then diversify their attention when capacity is higher; however, when there is a further
increase in capacity, they may reduce their attention on or even ignore the private
signal of higher quality and instead focus on the relatively imprecise public signal.
We label this phenomenon “attention misallocation.” Further, when the coordination
2Sims (2010) argues that finite capacity can be elastic in response to a change in environment, given
that the marginal cost of information processing is constant. In this case, inattentive agents are allowed
to adjust optimal capacity in such a way that the marginal cost of information-processing for the prob-
lem at hand remains constant, which is consistent with the concept of “elastic” capacity proposed in
Kahneman (1973). Luo and Young (2014) notes that the two assumptions, i.e., constant capacity and
constant marginal cost of information processing, are observationally equivalent in the sense that they
lead to the same model dynamics governed by the Kalman gain. In this study, for simplicity, we focus
on the fixed capacity assumption and do not consider the effect of prior uncertainty on elastic capacity.
3“Diminishing returns to attention” refers to the fact that the marginal increase in the agent’s welfare
is decreasing as capacity increases. Luo (2008) and Luo and Young (2010) illustrate this property in
partial equilibrium permanent income models with inattentive agents.
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motive or correlation is sufficiently high, the relative accuracy is not extreme and the
amount of capacity is not very high, multiple equilibria can arise in this model.
We also find a number of distinct results on social welfare, i.e., the average dis-
tance between individual decisions and the underlying state. First, social welfare may
decrease when individuals possess more capacity to process information. This result
hinges on the fact that agents may “misallocate” their attention from a social perspec-
tive and the misallocation may become more severe in response to higher capacity.
When there is an increase in capacity, agents can observe signals more clearly and bet-
ter estimate the underlying state. However, given the desire to align their actions, they
may decrease the attention paid to the private signal, even though it is relatively more
precise, and coordinate even more attention on the less precise public signal. When
agents take action, they assign a larger weight to the observation of the public sig-
nal, which exacerbates the “overreaction” to the public signal and causes a decrease in
social welfare.4
Second, the limit case of this model is the world of Morris and Shin (2002), in which
agents possess an infinite amount of capacity and can therefore perfectly observe both
signals. However, strikingly, social welfare in the Morris-Shin world may be even
lower than that in our model with capacity-limited agents. On the one hand, with
a finite amount of capacity, agents have a less precise estimation of the fundamental
than that in the Morris-Shin world. On the other hand, agents may endogenously pay
little attention to the public signal and therefore reduce their reliance on it in their
action which, to a certain degree, alleviates the overuse of the public signal. We show
that the second effect can dominate.
Third, our model also sheds some light on the debate about the transparency of
monetary policy. Morris and Shin (2002) show that social welfare can decrease when
the central bank delivers a clearer public announcement due to an overreaction to the
public signal. Svensson (2006) questions the empirical relevancy of this result and
argues that it only holds when public information is implausibly imprecise. We show
that endogenous attention allocation can amplify the “overreaction,” so that social
welfare can decrease, even when the precision of the public signal is reasonably high.
Finally, our results also offer a new perspective on the literature covering the effi-
cient use of information. Angeletos and Pavan (2007) show that equilibrium use and
the efficient use of information coincide if and only if the social and private values of
coordination are the same. However, once we allow for an endogenous information
4In the existing rational inattention literature, welfare typically increases in the capacity of process-
ing information. For example, Luo (2008) shows that the welfare loss due to finite capacity decreases
with channel capacity within a partial equilibrium permanent income model. Mac´kowiak and Wieder-
holt (2011) obtains the same result in a general equilibrium business cycle model.
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structure, i.e., attention allocation of inattentive agents, this relationship breaks down.
From a theoretical point of view, we also contribute to the literature of rational
inattention by characterizing attention allocation between two correlated signals. This
is technically challenging because, in this case, some capacity has to be “wasted” to
learn the correlated part twice, and it is difficult to separate the amount of capacity
that effectively reduces the observation noise of one signal from the other. We have
bypassed this difficulty by using a transformation in which we define “effective ca-
pacity” so that such a separation is feasible. The standard information processing
constraint for independent signals becomes a special case in our formulation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related liter-
ature. Section 3 characterizes a beauty contest model with rational inattentive agents
and examines the equilibrium properties of the model. Section 4 explores the attention
allocation decision via comparative statics. Section 5 studies the social welfare impli-
cations of limited attention. Section 6 addresses policy issues that are discussed in the
literature. Section 7 contains a discussion on the alternative information structures.
The last section concludes.
2. Related Literature
There are two approaches to modeling information acquisition in the related literature:
“costly acquisition” with the cost of acquiring information being convex in the preci-
sion of signals and “rational inattention” with a fixed amount of attention being split
among signals. These two approaches captures two distinct aspects of learning. With
the former, it is increasingly costly for agents to find additional evidence for the truth;
with the latter, agents are in a process of increasingly directed or refined search for an
answer when they spend more capacity in learning.5 In other words, the costly acqui-
sition approach assumes that agents incur increasing marginal cost when they acquire
more information, while the rational inattention approach assumes the marginal cost
of information acquisition is decreasing.
Pioneering studies that adopt the costly acquisition approach examine the impli-
cations of information acquisition in coordination games, e.g., Hellwig and Veldkamp
(2009), Myatt and Wallace (2012) and Yang (2013). Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) show
that there could exist multiple equilibria in their coordination model, because agents
make a binary signal purchase decision and a public signal becomes more valuable
when others also purchase it, due to strategic complementarity. Myatt and Wallace
(2012) show that equilibrium is unique, even with complementarity in action, when
5A capacity can be considered approximately the number of binary signals that partition states of
the world, and moreover, the interpretation of each signals depends on its predecessors, see Veldkamp
(2011) for elaboration.
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agents can also choose the observation noises. In contrast, we follow Sims (2003) and
assume that agents split a fixed amount of capacity on the signals to be observed. In
our model, we demonstrate that multiplicity can arise, when the information acqui-
sition is continuous and when learning takes the form of increasingly directed and
refined search, captured by the rational inattention approach.
We intend to offer a welfare analysis of the coordination game played by rationally
inattentive agents to study the effect that attention allocation has on social welfare.
Our setup differs from those of recent contributions to the literature that explicitly
deals with welfare-related issues. Mac´kowiak and Wiederholt (2009, 2011) study how
individuals or firms allocate their attention among two independent states when they
set the price in a market-based economy or take collective actions. In our case, the
two signals are correlated. We explicitly characterize the role of their correlation in
optimal attention allocation and show that correlation is of critical importance for the
multiplicity and uniqueness of equilibrium. For example, a high coordination motive
does not necessarily give rise to multiple equilibria, unless the correlation between the
two signals is sufficiently high.
This paper is closely related to the literature on the efficient use of information,
e.g. Angeletos and Pavan (2006) and Colombo, Femminis, and Pavan (2012). The lat-
ter studies the interaction between the inefficient use and acquisition of information.
In their model, agents pay to gain private information and can observe the public
announcement precisely. In contrast, agents in our model can observe neither of the
signals perfectly. Unlike their setup, which has a unique equilibrium, the rational inat-
tention assumption in our model gives rise to the possibilities of multiple equilibria
and of one of the signals being endogenously ignored.
Our work also contributes to the growing literature on the social value of public
information. Cornand and Heinemann (2008) consider an interesting setup in which
only a fraction of the agents are allowed to observe the public signal. In our model,
agents can endogenously choose to ignore either public or private information, or di-
versify their attention between both. Myatt and Wallace (2009) study this issue in a
model with multiple information sources that differ in the degree of publicity. In our
model, the publicity of public information is endogenous: the idiosyncratic observa-
tion noise is determined by the amount of attention paid.
This paper is also broadly related to the literature on information choice, attention
allocation and asset allocation, which includes Peng (2005), Peng and Xiong (2006),
Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009, 2010) and Mondria (2010). The framework adopted
in these studies consists of multiple assets and a continuum of agents who face the in-
formation processing constraints.
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3. The Model
3.1. Players, Payoffs and Coordination
The economy is occupied by a continuum of agents, indexed by i ∈ (0,1). Each of them
can choose an action, ai ∈ R. In this economy, the fundamental state, θ, affects payoffs
of agents. It is selected by nature but unknown to agents. Following Morris and Shin
(2002), the payoff for agent i is specified by
ui = −(ai − θ)2 − α1− α (Li − L¯), (1)
where α is constant, such that 0< α < 1, and Li =
∫
(aj − ai)2dj and L¯ =
∫
Lidi.
When agent i takes action, two types of loss are incurred. The first component is
measured by the distance between individual action and the uncertain state: agents
would be better off if they were to choose an action closer to the fundamental. The
second component is the distance between individual and average actions, which cap-
tures the idea that agents want to align their actions. A higher α implies that agents
assign a larger weight to this strategic concern in their payoff structure and have a
stronger incentive to coordinate.
3.2. Information Structure
Agents begin with some knowledge of the underlying state. Specifically, they share a
common normal prior over θ,
θ ∼ N
(
θ,σ2
)
(2)
where θ and σ2 are the mean and variance of the prior distribution, respectively. Each
agent can access two potentially observable signals, i.e., the private signal xi and the
public signal z, and the distribution is specified as follows,
si =
(
xi
z
)
,
(
θ + εxi
θ + εz
)
, (3)
where εxi ∼ N
(
0,σ2x
)
and εz ∼ N
(
0,σ2z
)
are independent of the true state θ. Note that
εxi is independently and identically distributed across agents while εz is common. The
ex ante covariance matrix of si can be written as
Σ =
(
σ2 + σ2x σ
2
σ2 σ2 + σ2z
)
. (4)
The information structure described thus far resembles that in Morris and Shin
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(2002). The public signal can be interpreted as a public announcement made by the
central bank or statistics released by the public agency. The private signal can be in-
terpreted as information only accessible to individuals and not to the general public.
Noise terms εxi and εz can be interpreted as senders’ noise contained in the signals,
which cannot be reduced by paying attention to the signals. One implicit assumption
is that agents cannot directly observe the fundamental and can obtain information
only through analyzing the noisy signals about it.
Following Sims (2003), we assume that agents have a finite capacity to process
available information, and that the reduction in uncertainty about the true signals is
limited by finite entropy. Therefore, agents can only observe the noisy signals:
sˆi =
(
xˆi
zˆi
)
=
(
xi
z
)
+
(
ξxi
ξzi
)
, (5)
where (ξxi ξzi)
′ are observation noises, which are independent of the true state and the
sender noises, and are independently and identically distributed across agents. The
presence of observation noises reflects the finite information processing capacity. Its
co-variance matrix is given by
Λ =
(
ω2x 0
0 ω2z
)
(6)
where ω2x and ω2z are variances in the observation noises for private and public signals,
respectively. Because the observation noises are idiosyncratic, noisy observation of the
public signal, zˆi, is imperfectly correlated across the agents, whereas the observation
of the private signal, xˆi, remains independent.
We define the posterior covariance matrix of si with Ψ ≡ Var(si|sˆi), which can be
determined using the following Gaussian updating formula,
Ψ = Σ− Σ (Σ+Λ)−1Σ or Ψ−1 = Σ−1 +Λ−1. (7)
We assume that each agent in this economy possesses a limited amount of capac-
ity to process information. Specifically, each agent is assumed to face the following
information-processing constraint:
1
2
ln
( |Σ|
|Ψ|
)
≤ κ, (8)
where |Σ| and |Ψ| denote the determinant of the prior covariance matrix of si and the
corresponding posterior covariance matrix, respectively, and κ is positive and denote
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the individual’s finite channel capacity. This constraint implies that the reduction in
the uncertainty about the state gained from observing new signals is bounded from
above by a finite capacity.
Given the specifications of (4), (6) and (7), the information processing constraint (8)
can be rewritten as
1
2
ln
(
ω2x +
(
σ2x + σ
2)(1− ρ2)
ω2x
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
κˆx
+
1
2
ln
(
ω2z +
(
σ2z + σ
2)(1− ρ2)
ω2z
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
κˆz
≤ κˆ, (9)
where ρ is the prior correlation across signals and κˆ is the effective capacity. They are
defined by,
ρ ≡ Corr(xi,z) =
√
σ2σ2
(σ2x + σ
2) (σ2z + σ
2)
, κˆ ≡ 1
2
ln
(
exp (2κ)− ρ2 (exp (2κ)− 1)
)
.
Effective capacity is the amount of capacity used to reduce observation noises
while a certain amount of capacity must be “wasted” to learn the correlated part of
the two signals twice. Intuitively, for a fixed amount of κ, the higher is the correlation
between signals and the lower is the effective capacity, κˆ. If the signals are indepen-
dent, i.e., ρ = 0, then κ = κˆ.
The effective capacity spent on the private and public signals are denoted by κˆx
and κˆz, respectively. Naturally, we impose the following non-negativity restriction,
κˆz ≥ 0, and κˆx ≥ 0. (10)
The variances in observation noises can be recovered from equation (9) as follows:
ω2x =
(
σ2x + σ
2)(1− ρ2)
exp(2κˆx)− 1 , ω
2
z =
(
σ2z + σ
2)(1− ρ2)
exp(2κˆz)− 1 . (11)
If agents spend more effective capacity on observing a signal, then that signals’ ob-
servation noise is smaller or it is clearer to the agents. In a limit case, agents possess
an infinite amount of capacity and can therefore perfectly observe both signals, i.e.,
ω2x = 0 and ω2z = 0. To facilitate the characterization that follows, we define the rela-
tive accuracy of the public signal by
∇≡
√
(σ2x + σ
2)
(σ2z + σ
2)
,
and it can be readily verified that ρ <∇ < 1ρ .
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3.3. Equilibrium
This model environment can be considered as a two-stage game. In the first stage,
nature draws the underlying state and agents make decisions on their attention allo-
cation by optimally splitting the effective capacity between the signals to be observed.
In the second stage, agents observe the realized signals and then take action.
We focus on a linear symmetric equilibrium in which all agents follow the same
strategy in attention allocation and adopt a linear strategy in actions. Because the
attention allocation is determined in the first stage, the heterogeneity in signal obser-
vations in the second stage does not affect their decision. Once agents decide their at-
tention allocation, the variances in observation noises are also determined. The action
strategy ai in the second stage is linear in both the prior and observations on signals,
ai =Πθ,iθ +Πx,i xˆi +Πz,i zˆi, (12)
where (Πθ,i,Πx,i,Πz,i) are the weights assigned to the prior and observations.
We first solve the second-stage game, where the equilibrium remains unique. The
solution to this game is the optimal weighting rule for any arbitrary allocation of at-
tention in the first stage. Then, we solve for the optimal attention allocation in the first
stage, taking the optimal weighting rule as given.
Given the linearity of the strategy and the normality of the information structure,
we can show that an agent’s action is a weighted average of the observations and their
prior. That is,
Πθ,i +Πx,i +Πz,i = 1. (13)
Individual i’s payoff depends on the other agents’ choices. Let the action strategy
of the other agents be (κˆx, κˆz,Πθ,Πx,Πz). The expected utility of individual i, E[ui],
can be written as the sum of three components,
E [ui] =− 11− α
(
Π2θ,i
1
φθ
+Π2x,i
1
φx,i
+Π2z,i
1
φz,i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
L†
− α
1− α
(
(Πz,i −Πz)2σ2z + (Πθ,i −Πθ)2σ2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
L‡
+ C, (14)
with
φθ =
1
(1− α)σ2 , φx,i =
1
σ2x +ω
2
x,i
, φz,i =
1
(1− α)σ2z +ω2z,i
, (15)
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and
C = −α
1− α
[(∫
a2j dj− a¯2
)
− L¯
]
.
The first component of the utility function, −L†, is the quadratic loss of agent i, when
everybody uses the same weights on their signals in action strategy. It shows that both
sender and observation noises are of importance for the expected loss. The second
component, −L‡, is another possible source of expected loss for agent i: utilizing a
different action strategy from that used by the other agents. Obviously, when agent i
adopts the same strategy, L‡ becomes zero. Moreover, C is the effect of actions taken
by other agents on agent i and it cannot be affected by her choice. Note that ω2x,i and
ω2z,i are the variances of agent i’s observation noises on the private and public signals,
respectively, which are given by (11), and a is the aggregate action.
3.4. Characterization
Agent i maximizes E [ui] by choosing κˆz,i optimally.6 To analyze the equilibrium allo-
cation of attention, we study agent i’s best response allocation strategy. We begin by
defining the relative marginal return of attention on the public signal, which turns out
to be convenient in the analysis of the main mechanisms. That is,
γ (κˆz,i, κˆ∗z ) ≡
∂E [ui]/∂κˆz,i
∂E [ui]/∂κˆx,i
. (16)
It is straightforward that γ (κˆz,i, κˆ∗z ) measures the relative attractiveness of paying ad-
ditional attention to the public signal, given others’ attention allocation plan κˆ∗z . There
are four forces that shape the attention allocation decision and thus affect γ. In the
following sections, we fix the correlation between the two signals and discuss the role
of the other three. We elaborate on the effect of the correlation in Section 4.2.
Lemma 1. γ (κˆz,i, κˆ∗z ) decreases in κˆz,i, increases in ∇, and increases in α.
First, the force of diminishing returns to attention takes hold. The more attention
that is paid to the public signal, the less attractive it becomes. Second, agents prefer the
signal with higher accuracy; that is, the higher its relative accuracy, the more attractive
it is. Third, the coordination motive tilts agents’ choice toward learning the public
signal because they are rewarded in two ways when they spend more attention on
the public signal: they are better informed about the underlying true state and their
actions are better aligned. In other words, due to the coordination motive, the relative
6Note that the optimal weighting rule
(
Π∗z,i,Π
∗
x,i,Π
∗
θ,i
)
in the second stage is uniquely determined
by the attention allocation plan
(
κˆ∗z,i, κˆ
∗
x,i
)
.
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attractiveness of the public signal is magnified. The first part of Lemma 1 also implies
that agent i increases her attention on the public signal if and only if γ (κˆz,i, κˆ∗z ) > 1,
and decreases her attention if and only if γ (κˆz,i, κˆ∗z ) < 1.
In symmetric equilibrium, we impose the condition that κˆz,i = κˆ∗z , and three situ-
ations can arise. First, agents spend all of their attention on the public signal, where
γ (κˆ∗z , κˆ∗z )> 1 and κˆ∗z = κˆ. Second, they spend all of their attention on the private signal,
where γ (κˆ∗z , κˆ∗z ) < 1 and κˆ∗z = 0. Third, they split their attention between both signals,
where γ (κˆ∗z , κˆ∗z ) = 1 and κˆ∗z ∈ [0, κˆ]. The following proposition offers the complete
equilibrium characterization.
Proposition 1. In linear symmetric equilibria, agents adopt the same attention allocation
strategy, where the equilibrium attention allocation is such that
κˆ∗z =

0 if ∇≤∇0
˜ˆκz if ∇ ∈ (min{∇0,∇1},max{∇0,∇1})
κˆ if ∇≥∇1
(17)
κˆ∗x = κˆ − κˆ∗z
where
˜ˆκz =
1
2
κˆ + ln
(
(1− α) (1− ρ∇) + (∇− ρ)exp(κˆ)− (1− ρ2)
(1− α) (1− ρ∇)exp(κˆ) + (∇− ρ)−∇ (1− ρ2)
)
(18)
and
∇0 = exp (κˆ)ρ+ 1exp (κˆ) + ρ , ∇1 =
(1− α) (exp(2κˆ)− 1) + (1− ρ2)
(1− α) (exp(2κˆ)− 1)ρ+ exp(κˆ) (1− ρ2) . (19)
There exist multiple equilibria, i.e., κˆ∗z = {0, ˜ˆκz, κˆ}, if and only if
∇1 <∇ <∇0 and α ≥ 1− ρexp(κˆ) ; (20)
otherwise, the equilibrium attention allocation is unique.
When the relative accuracy is extreme, agents find it optimal to focus on only one
of the signals; that is, for a fixed amount of capacity κˆ and a coordination motive α,
if the relative accuracy is sufficiently high, i.e., max{∇1,∇0} ≤ ∇, then agents choose
to only observe the public signal. If the relative accuracy is sufficiently low, i.e., ∇ ≤
min{∇1,∇0}, then agents choose to observe the private signal only.
When the relative accuracy is not too extreme, this model can admit either multiple
11
01
κˆ
∗ z/
κˆ
∇ρ
b
1/ρ
b
(a) α < 1− ρ/exp (κˆ) .
0
1
κˆ
∗ z/
κˆ
∇ρ
b
1/ρ
b
(b) α ≥ 1− ρ/exp (κˆ) .
Figure 1. The equilibrium uniqueness and multiplicity.
equilibria or a unique equilibrium.7 See Figure 1. Multiple equilibria can arise when
the coordination motive (or correlation) is sufficiently high and/or the total amount
capacity is relatively low. First, the relative accuracy cannot be too extreme for the
existence of multiple equilibria. When everybody focuses on the lower quality signal,
agent i finds that the benefit of deviating and instead focusing on the relatively more
precise signal is dominated by the cost of adopting a different strategy from other
agents. Second, the coordination motive must be sufficiently large, such that when the
strategic concern is strong, agents are more severely punished for deviating from the
strategy adopted by other agents and therefore have less incentive to do so. Third,
if the amount of capacity available is too large, then it is too costly for agent i to fol-
low the others’ strategy, conditional on the rest of the population coordinating on a
“wrong” choice. In contrast, there is only a unique equilibrium if the coordination
motive (or correlation) is not sufficiently strong or capacity is large.
In both cases, a symmetric equilibrium is formed if all agents choose the global
minimizer of L†, because both L† and L‡ (defined in equation (14)) achieve global
minimization and no individual has an incentive to deviate from it. We label it strategic
utility maximizing equilibrium, because it generates the maximum of strategic utility,
which is defined by E[usi ] ≡ −L† −L‡; that is the component, on which the choice of
agents has an influence.
4. Attention Allocation
In this section, we analyze the comparative statics of the equilibrium attention allo-
cation, not only because the issue of attention allocation itself is interesting but also
because it provides building blocks for our examination of social welfare in Section 5,
and policy issues in Section 6. We also highlight the role that the correlation between
7Technically, L† can be either quasi-concave or quasi-convex in κˆz,i. The equilibrium is unique if and
only if it is quasi-concave. In this model, the entropy is not a convex function of signal precision and that
is why multiple equilibria can possibly emerge in this model. In contrast, with the costly acquisition
approach, the cost function of noise reduction is usually assumed to be convex.
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the public and private signals plays in attention allocation, as it is absent in most of
the previous literature.
4.1. Non-monotonic Attention Allocation
For any relative accuracy and coordination motive, when the capacity is sufficiently
large, the effect of diminishing returns eventually dominates, which leads to a diversi-
fied attention allocation. Because both signals can be extremely clear, the coordination
motive and relative accuracy do not affect the attention allocation, with agents simply
splitting a large amount of attention evenly between the two signals.
Proposition 2. The share of effective capacity devoted to the public signal, κˆ∗z /κˆ, converges to
1/2, when capacity is sufficiently high.
When the capacity is not large enough, the three forces characterized in Lemma
1 are intertwined and affect how the equilibrium attention allocation responds to an
increase in capacity.
Proposition 3. If the public signal is less accurate than the private signal, agents specialize in
learning the latter, when the capacity is low. When the capacity increases, the share of effective
capacity devoted to the public signal is monotonically increasing, if the private signal is very
precise or the coordination motive is not so strong; otherwise, it is hump-shaped.
In the proof of the proposition, we offer a complete characterization of this com-
parative statics. If the private signal is sufficiently accurate or the coordination motive
is sufficiently low, it is never worthwhile to only observe the public signal, despite
the effect of the coordination motive. The key trade-off here is between the effects of
diminishing returns and relative accuracy, with the former eventually dominating the
latter when the capacity is higher. Let κˆ0 be the threshold value of κˆ, at which agents
are indifferent about specialization in the private signal or diversification. In this case,
when the capacity is higher than κˆ0, the share of attention devoted to the public signal
monotonically increases in κˆ. See Figure 2(a).
If the coordination motive is strong, its effect manifests in the non-monotonicity of
the share of attention spent on the public signal. See Figure 2(b). When there is an
increase in capacity, both the diminishing returns and the coordination motive have
larger effects, and both forces tilt the choice of attention allocation toward the public
signal. Thus, there is a sharp increase in κˆ∗z /κˆ. However, when agents allocate a pre-
dominant share of their attention to the public signal, the mechanism of diminishing
returns to attention takes stronger effect and pushes agents to diversify. The effect of
the coordination motive is eventually dominated and therefore, κˆ∗z /κˆ decreases in κˆ.
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Figure 2. The equilibrium share of attention allocated to the public signal is either monotonic or hump-
shaped in effective capacity.
If the precision of the private signal is close to that of the public one, the effect of
the strong coordination motive can be so prominent that the share of attention on the
public signal can reach 100%. See Figure 2(c). It is interesting to observe that in this
case, agents’ attention fans out, contracts inward, then fans out again. The number of
signals that agents pick up does not monotonically increase in capacity.
Notably, κˆ∗z /κˆ being hump-shaped implies that, the absolute amount of attention
paid to the more precise private signal can decrease (even to zero) when the total
amount of capacity increases, as the result of a strong coordination motive. We for-
malize this mechanism with “attention misallocation,” and demonstrate further how
this mechanism critically affects the social welfare of this economy in Section 5.
Definition 1. (Attention misallocation) Let j be the relatively more precise signal, i.e., σj =
min{σx,σz} and j ∈ {x,z}. Attention misallocation arises, if the absolute amount of attention
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paid to the signal j in equilibrium decreases in response to an increase in total capacity, i.e.,
dκˆ∗j /dκˆ < 0.
Lemma 2. When the private signal is more precise than the public signal, the ab-
solute amount of effective capacity allocated to observing the private signal can even
decrease in the total amount of capacity, on the condition that 2α+ ρ > 1. Specifically,
dκˆ∗x/dκˆ < 0.
When the coordination motive is very strong, all three equilibria can exist in the
intermediate range of capacity. See Figure 2(d). Intuitively, this is the case in which
none of the effects of relative accuracy, diminishing returns or coordination motive
dominate the other two. Once other agents adopt one of the strategies, it is costly
to deviate because the coordination motive is very high. Note that, in this case, the
diversification equilibrium can never be the strategic utility maximizing equilibrium.8
Therefore, if we focus on the strategic utility maximizing equilibrium, agents can shift
their focus entirely from the private to the public signal when capacity crosses a cutoff
value of κˆs. The key trade-off here is between taking advantage of high accuracy and
the desire for coordination.
In contrast, if the public signal is relatively more accurate, agents specialize in
learning the public signal to take advantage of both higher accuracy and better coordi-
nation when the capacity is lower than κˆ1, i.e., the threshold value at which agents are
indifferent between specialization or diversification. They eventually diversify, due to
the effect of diminishing returns, and the equilibrium share of attention devoted to the
public signal decreases monotonically. See Figure 2(e).
4.2. The Role of Correlation
In this section, we turn to the role of correlation. The indirect effect of a change in
correlation is straightforward. For any capacity κ, a higher correlation reduces the ef-
fective capacity available to agents, dκˆ/dρ< 0. Intuitively, because the two signals are
correlated, observing both of them costs agents some capacity to learn the correlated
part twice. The direct effect is characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. For any effective capacity, a higher correlation dampens the effect of dimin-
ishing returns to attention and amplifies the effect of the coordination motive. Specifically, (i)
both κˆ0 and κˆ1 increase in ρ; (ii) κˆs decreases in ρ.
First, for any amount of effective capacity available to agents, the observation
noises are reduced more effectively when the correlation is higher. See equation (11).
8When there exist multiple equilibria, L† is quasi-convex and the diversification allocation leads to
a local minimum of E[usi ].
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Because the two signals are correlated, knowing one of the signals helps reduce the
other’s observation noise. Therefore, agents have a stronger incentive to focus on one
of the signals and the effect of diminishing returns is mitigated.
To demonstrate this, consider the case where only unique equilibrium exists for any
capacity.9 Due to the effect of diminishing returns, agents switch from specialization
to diversification when the effective capacity is higher than κˆ0 for the case of∇< 1 and
κˆ1 for the case of ∇ > 1. When the correlation is higher, both cutoff values increase.
That is, agents find it worthwhile to diversify only when the effective capacity is at a
higher level. In this respect, the effect of an increase in the correlation differs from that
of a rise in the coordination motive α, which raises κˆ1 and lowers κˆ0.
Second, the correlation across signals also amplifies the effect of the coordination
motive. Consider the case where the private signal is more precise. The rise in correla-
tion entails a change in the trade-off between relative accuracy and coordination mo-
tive. In such a case, if agents spend more of their attention on the public signal, they
estimate the underlying state less accurately but they can better align their actions.
When the correlation between the private and public signals is higher, the two sig-
nals become more “substitutable,” in terms of estimating the fundamental. Therefore,
agents incur less welfare loss when they spend capacity on the less accurate public
signal and they favor the public signal even more.
There are three ways to see the effect of this mechanism. First, as shown in Propo-
sition 1, for any effective capacity level κˆ, and relative accuracy∇∈ [∇1,∇0], multiple
equilibria emerge in this model when either α or ρ is sufficiently large. Second, when
we consider the strategic utility maximizing equilibrium in this case, agents shift their
focus from the private to the public signal at κˆ = κˆs. We observe that κˆs decreases in
both ρ and α. Third, in Lemma 2, we show that, on the condition that either α or ρ is
sufficiently high, attention misallocation can arise.
5. "Too Much of a Good Thing": Social Welfare Analysis
Social welfare is the average distance of individual actions in society from the funda-
mental. Agents benefit more from predicting the average opinion than other individ-
uals, but it is a zero-sum game at the society level. In other words, the coordination
motive only affects individual welfare and disappears at the society level. In this sec-
tion, we analyze the comparative statics of social welfare by focusing on the strategic
utility maximizing equilibrium.
The expected social welfare, E [W s (a,θ)], is a weighted average of E [usi ], which is
the objective expected utility maximized by agents, and the spillover effect, which is
9As shown in Proposition 1, it is the case where α+ ρ/exp(κˆ) < 1.
16
not considered by agents. The spillover receives a higher weight in social welfare if
the coordination motive, α, is stronger.
E [W s (a,θ)] = −E
[∫
i
(ai − θ)2
]
= (1− α)
[
−σ2
(
1+
φx
φθ
+
φz
φθ
)−1]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
E[usi ]
+α
[
−Π2θσ2 −Π2zσ2z
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Spillover
.
The unintended spillover effect arises from agents’ desire to align their actions and
the fact that they do not consider the effects that their choices have on others. Agents
make use of the common prior and their correlated noisy observations on the public
signal, when they forecast the actions of others and choose their own actions. As both
the prior and the public signal are noisy, the actions taken by agents may be anchored
around commonly known but imprecise information. Therefore, the spillover con-
tributes negatively to social welfare and its magnitude is determined by how precise
the signals are, i.e., σ2 and σ2z , and how much agents rely on them, i.e., Πθ and Πz.
Proposition 5. (Social Welfare and Capacity) When the capacity to process information
increases, social welfare can decrease. Specifically, there may exist κˆa < κˆb, such that
E [W s(κˆa)] > E [W s(κˆb)] .
It is interesting to observe that a higher capacity to process information does not
necessarily imply higher social welfare. On the one hand, E
[
usi |xˆi, zˆi
]
, the part of wel-
fare optimized by agents, always increases in capacity. On the other hand, the spillover
can cause a decrease in social welfare when there is an increase in capacity. We know
that spending more attention on the private signal reduces the spillover and enhances
social welfare by lowering Πz. However, recall the mechanism of attention misallo-
cation shown in Lemma 2, agents may decrease the absolute amount of attention on
the more accurate private signal when capacity increases, which results in a higher
Πz. Therefore, an increase in capacity can be detrimental to social welfare. In addi-
tion to this mechanism, holding constant κˆ∗x, a higher capacity implies that the amount
of attention allocated to the public signal increases. Therefore, agents assign a larger
weight to their observations on the public signal, zˆi, which is also socially costly.10 In
short, a strong coordination motive or a high correlation between signals can distort
10We show that ∂Πθ/∂κˆ∗x = 0; that is, the increase in φx must equal the decrease in φz when κˆ∗x is opti-
mally chosen. ∂Πθ/∂κˆ < 0, as holding κˆ∗x constant, a higher capacity implies a higher φz and therefore,
Πθ must decrease. Intuitively, when the capacity is higher, agents rely more on their observation(s) and
less on their prior knowledge.
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Figure 3. The non-monotonicity of social welfare.
the allocation of attention so much that the spillover increases quickly in response to a
higher capacity, which results in a decrease in overall social welfare.
To demonstrate this mechanism, we choose a set of parameters with high coordina-
tion motive (or high correlation) and intermediate relative accuracy, such that agents
switch their attention entirely from the private signal to public signal at κˆs, in the
strategic utility maximizing equilibrium.11 When κˆ = κˆs, agents are indifferent about
only observing the private signal or the public signal; that is, E
[
usi |xˆi
]
= E
[
usi |zˆi
]
. In
other words, φx = φz. For the same reason, Πθ is the same in both cases. When κˆ in-
creases from κˆ−s to κˆ+s , κˆ∗x decreases from κˆs to 0 andΠz jumps from 0 to 1−Πθ, so that
there is a discontinuous decrease in social welfare. Because E [W s] monotonically in-
creases in κˆ, when κˆ < κˆs, there must exist κˆa and κˆb such that E [W s(κˆa)] > E [W s(κˆb)]
and κˆa < κˆs < κˆb. See Figure 3(a).
If the accuracy of the private signal is higher (or ∇ is lower), the absolute amount
of attention paid to the private signal decreases gradually and the weight assigned to
the observation on the public signal also increases gradually. Therefore, social welfare
may decrease continuously in capacity. See Figure 3(b). The following equation sum-
marizes the key mechanisms discussed above, where the sign of + (−) stands for a
derivative being positive (negative).
dE [W s]
dκˆ
= (1− α) dE
[
usi
]
dκˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+α
d
(−Π2θσ2)
dκˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+
∂
(−Π2zσ2z )
∂κˆ∗x︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
dκˆ∗x
dκˆ︸︷︷︸
+/−
+
∂
(−Π2zσ2z )
∂κˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
 .
11This situation arises, when α> 1− ρ and ∇˜<∇< 1, where ∇˜ is defined in the proof of Proposition
3. Under this set of parameters, this model admits multiple equilibria and in this example, we focus
on the change of social welfare in response to an change in capacity in a strategic utility maximizing
equilibrium. However, this result does not rely on this particular case. In fact, the proof of Proposition
6 also implies Proposition 5. To establish Proposition 6, we focus on cases in which only a unique
equilibrium exists.
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Proposition 6. (Too Much Capacity) Social welfare can be higher when agents are endowed
with a finite amount of capacity to process information than when they have an infinite amount
of capacity. Specifically, there is a finite κˆ′, such that
E
[W s(κˆ′)] > lim
κˆ→+∞
E [W s(κˆ)] ≡ E [Wms] .
This result is striking. When agents possess an infinite amount of capacity to pro-
cess information, they can perfectly observe both signals. In this case, the model is
identical to the Morris-Shin model, in which the social inefficiency is well understood,
i.e., agents overreact to the public signal. Specifically, the weight agents assign to the
public signal in their action is higher than that in their posterior belief, which is so-
cially costly because the coordination motive driving the overreaction does not count
in social welfare. Social welfare in the Morris-Shin model can be written as follows
E [Wms] = −
[
φmsx + φ
ms
z +
1
(1−α)φθ
(φmsx + φ
ms
z + φθ)
2 +
Πmsz
α
(1−α)
φmsx + φ
ms
z + φθ
]
1
σ4
,
where variables with superscript ms are counterparts in the Morris-Shin model.
In our case, capacity-limited agents cannot clearly observe signals; thus, their es-
timation of the underlying state is less accurate than that when they have an infinite
amount of capacity. However, agents may endogenously choose to spend very little
attention on observing the public signal, as a result, the total amount of noise in the
observation, zˆi, becomes very large. Therefore, they rely on it much less when they
take actions; that is, the weight that it is assigned, Πz, can be lower than Πmsz . A lower
level of capacity can actually be welfare enhancing, because it does, to some extent,
correct the inefficient use of public information. If the second effect dominates the
first, social welfare can be higher than that in the Morris-Shin model. See Figure 4.
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We demonstrate the two opposing effects with the following simple case. Let the
total amount of capacity in our model be κˆ0. We choose a set of parameter such that
agents are indifferent between specialization in the private signal or diversification;
that is, they endogenously ignore the public signal, or, φz = 0.12 We write social welfare
as follows
E [W s] = −
[
φx +
1
(1−α)φθ
(φx + φθ)
2
]
1
σ4
.
Given the finite capacity, agents cannot perfectly observe the private signal and
thus the precision of observation of the private signal is smaller; that is, φx < φmsx .
Moreover, in the Morris-Shin model, the public signal is also informative and enhances
the estimation of the underlying state, which results in φx < φmsx + φmsz . Intuitively,
agents with finite capacity are always worse off in terms of estimating the underlying
state. It always holds that
−
[
φx +
1
(1−α)φθ
(φx + φθ)
2
]
1
σ4
< −
[
φmsx + φ
ms
z +
1
(1−α)φθ
(φmsx + φ
ms
z + φθ)
2
]
1
σ4
.
The second term in E [Wms] shows the additional welfare loss caused by overusing
the public signal in the Morris-Shin model. There is no overuse of the public signal in
this particular finite-capacity case in that Πz = 0, because φz = 0. The socially costly
overreaction to the public signal does not exist in this case
0> −
[
Πmsz
α
(1−α)
φmsx + φ
ms
z + φθ
]
1
σ4
.
When social inefficiency is high in the Morris-Shin model, the welfare loss due to
“overreaction” to the public signal can be so large that the gain from a better esti-
mation of the fundamental is dominated.
Given that the capacity can be “too much,” is it possible for agents to voluntarily
burn some capacity to achieve higher welfare? The answer is no. That is because, if
everyone else collectively discards some of their capacity, individual i can increase her
welfare by fully using all of her capacity to enhance the estimation of the fundamental
in the first stage and adopting the same action strategy in the second stage to avoid
being “punished” for using a different strategy.13
12Section 4 demonstrates that such a κˆ0 exists, unless both α + ρ > 1 and ∇ > ∇˜ hold, where ∇˜ is
defined in the proof of Proposition 3.
13This argument can be formalized and its proof is available on request.
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6. Policy Issues
In previous sections, we have fully characterized the optimal attention allocation and
explored its implications for social welfare via comparative statics. In this section,
we discuss two welfare-related issues to shed light on how policy prescriptions in the
literature can be amended, considering that agents are capacity-constrained.
6.1. Generalization and Efficient Use of Information
Angeletos and Pavan (2007) offer a flexible efficiency benchmark to assess the wel-
fare properties of a general class of games where the social value of coordination may
be higher or lower than the private one. In this section, we demonstrate that our
key results on social welfare can continue to hold in that generalized environment.
Moreover, we also explain how the equilibrium multiplicity generated by our model
mechanism would affect policy prescriptions offered in their work.
To accommodate this analysis, we enrich the payoff structure in this model by fol-
lowing Angeletos and Pavan (2007), where the utility function is specified by a general
linear quadratic function, u = U (k,K,σk,θ), where k and K are individual and aggre-
gate actions, respectively; σk ≡
∫
i (k− K)2 di is the action dispersion. In fact, we can
write the utility function as follows,
u ≡− (ki − θ)2 − r (ki − K)2 + rσ2k︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
+
(
Uσσ
2
− r
)
σ2k︸ ︷︷ ︸
I I
+
(
UKK
2
+ r
)
K2︸ ︷︷ ︸
I I I
+ (UkK − 2r) kK︸ ︷︷ ︸
IV
+
(
Uθθ
2
+ 1
)
θ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
V
+
(
Ukk
2
+ 1+ r
)
k2︸ ︷︷ ︸
VI
+ (Ukθ − 2) kθ +UKθKθ.
where r is a positive constant. Our model is a special case, where we have Uσσ = 2r,
UKK = −2r, UkK = 2r, Uθθ = −2, Ukk = −2 (1+ r), Ukθ = 2 and UKθ = 0.14 Part I is the
standard beauty contest utility specification, by letting α = r1−r .
The private value of coordination, or how much agents care about aligning their
actions, is measured by α. The socially optimal degree of coordination is represented
by α∗ and it is the weight that the social planner would assign to the aggregate action
14We restrict our attention to the case where there is no inefficiency under complete information. That
is, we impose a restriction on Ukθ and UKθ , which is standard as in Angeletos and Pavan (2007).
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in its best response. In the general case, they can be characterized as follows,
α∗ = 1− Ukk + 2UkK +UKK
Ukk +Uσσ
α = 1− Ukk +UkK
Ukk
. (21)
Note that the beauty contest game is a special case with α∗ = 0 (i.e., the social plan-
ner does not value coordination) and with α > 0 (i.e., individuals care about aligning
their actions). Efficient attention allocation and efficient use of information are de-
rived by solving a social planner problem while respecting the information processing
constraint (9).
First, in the benchmark case, we have demonstrated in Proposition 5 and Lemma
2 that social welfare may decrease in response to an increase in capacity due to atten-
tion misallocation, on condition that coordination motive and/or correlation between
signals are sufficiently strong. Alternatively, this result can be interpreted as follows.
The social planner does not value coordination among agents at all in the beauty con-
test case. When the private value of coordination perceived by the agents is high, the
equilibrium allocation may deviate a lot from the social optimum. Therefore, a further
increase in capacity can result in an even severer attention misallocation, which may
cause a reduction in social welfare.
In this general case, this mechanism can still produce the same effect, that social
welfare decreases in capacity, when there is a large enough discrepancy between the
value of coordination perceived by individuals, α, and the central planner, α∗. To il-
lustrate this point, consider the following scenario. Suppose the payoff function is
parametrized such that α = α∗. A positive Uσσ implies that the action dispersion has
positive externality on individuals’ payoffs. An increase in Uσσ reduces the social
value of coordination, α∗.15 Therefore, the central planner prefers a higher action dis-
persion and allocating even less attention to the public signal and more attention to the
private signal. However, the equilibrium value of coordination is not affected by the
change in Uσσ. When Uσσ is large enough, the attention misallocation, due to the dis-
crepancy in equilibrium and efficient degree of coordination, can intensify and cause
a decrease in social welfare when capacity increases.16
Second, one of the key insights in Angeletos and Pavan (2007) with the exogenous
information structure is that the equilibrium use of information is efficient if and only
if the social and private values of coordination coincide. However, this result may not
hold once we allow for an endogenous information structure. Further, in this model,
even though attention allocation is efficient, it does not necessarily lead to an efficient
use of information.
15Note that both Ukk + 2UkK +UKK and Ukk +Uσσ are negative in this case.
16Similar arguments can be applied to other cases and detailed analysis is available on request.
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In contrast to Angeletos and Pavan (2007), we argue that even when the central
planner corrects the coordination incentives of agents to the socially optimal level with
a tax policy, the equilibrium attention allocation and the use of information may still be
not socially optimal. The key to understanding this argument is to recall that multiple
equilibria may arise. Consider the case where the socially optimal degree of coordina-
tion α∗ is higher than the private value of coordination α and it is so high that there
exist multiple solutions in the central planner’s social welfare optimization problem.
It is obvious that the central planner picks the solution that gives rise to the highest
social welfare. In a decentralized economy, with a policy similar to that proposed in
Angeletos and Pavan (2007), the central planner can incentivize agents to value the co-
ordination as much as it does, but it is still undetermined on which equilibrium agents
coordinate. The planner needs another set of tools that help direct agents to coordinate
on the social welfare maximizing equilibrium.
Further, in this framework, the equilibrium use of information can still be ineffi-
cient, even though the equilibrium attention allocation is efficient. To see this, we as-
sume that α> α∗ > 0. The social planner also values the coordination and may dictate
that agents focus on the public signal and ignore the private one. Under the same con-
ditions, individuals could also choose exactly the same attention allocation. In other
words, the attention allocation is socially optimal. However, as the private and social
values of coordination differ, in the second stage, individuals would assign a higher
weight in their action strategy to the common prior than would the social planner. To
understand this, recall the fact that the common prior serves a “free public signal,”
which does not require any attention, and observations on the public signal are im-
perfectly correlated across agents in this economy due to the idiosyncratic observation
noises. Therefore, the equilibrium use of information is still not socially optimal.
6.2. Transparency of Public Announcement
This study adds another dimension to the debate about central bank transparency.
Unlike the common presumption that higher transparency is always beneficial, Morris
and Shin (2002) show that it may be detrimental to social welfare when the central
bank delivers clearer public announcements. In their beauty contest model with an
exogenous information structure, an increase in the precision of public information
entails two opposing effects. On the one hand, it allows agents to better estimate
the underlying fundamental. On the other hand, it also increases agents’ reliance on
the noisy public information in their actions, which is socially costly. Both effects are
enlarged as the precision of public information increases. Morris and Shin (2002) show
that social welfare is U-shaped, such that when the precision of the public signal is
exceedingly low, the second effect dominates. Specifically, social welfare decreases in
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Figure 5. Central bank transparency and social welfare.
its precision if and only if
σ2x
σ2z
+
σ2x
σ2
< (2α− 1)(1− α). (22)
Therefore, it may be socially desirable to withhold public information.
One important critique of this argument is Svensson (2006), that questions its em-
pirical relevancy and stresses that it can hold only when public information is im-
plausibly imprecise.17 See the dashed line in Figure 5 where social welfare is plotted
against the left side of equation (22), holding σ2x and σ2 fixed.18
However, we argue that the precision of the public signal needs not necessarily to
be exceedingly low to generate a decline in social welfare, when we allow for endoge-
nous attention allocation. When agents can decide to which information source they
pay their attention, the precision of each signal that they observe becomes endoge-
nous in that it not only depends on variances in sender noises, but also on those of
observation noises, which are chosen by agents.
To illustrate this, we plot social welfare in our model with the solid line in Figure
5.19 When the precision of the public signal is very low, agents ignore it and focus on
the private signal. Therefore, a marginal increase in the precision of the public signal
does not affect social welfare. When the precision of the public signal is sufficiently
high, agents diversify their attention. An increase in its precision leads to a higher
reliance on the public signal in their action, as in Morris and Shin (2002). In addition,
17Even the maximum of the right side of (22) is a very small number, which implies that σ2z must be
sufficiently large for this condition to hold.
18In this numerical example, α = 0.7 and σx = 0.1. σ is normalized to unit.
19In this numerical example, the capacity available to agents is κ = 3.2 bits and all other parame-
ters are the same as those for computing the counterpart in the Morris-Shin model. With this set of
parameters, there is a unique equilibrium.
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agents also direct a larger proportion of their attention toward the public signal in
response to a higher precision. This additional mechanism reinforces the previous one
and both contribute to the decline in social welfare. As a result, social welfare still
decreases, even when the precision of the public signal is reasonably large.20
7. Alternative Information Structures
Following Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) and Myatt and Wallace (2012), we have made
two implicit assumptions about the way in which agents learn in the benchmark
model. First, agents cannot directly observe the fundamental, but can learn about
it through analyzing noisy signals. In other words, agents can only obtain noisy ob-
servations about the underlying signals that are informative about the fundamental.21
That assumption is realistic in settings in which information acquisition takes the form
of the assimilation of the available information and agents face a constraint to infor-
mation transmission and comprehension. Second, the source of noisy information can
be both public and private.22 That assumption captures the scenario that agents may
have access to information sources of a different nature, i.e., economy-wide informa-
tion that is commonly accessible and local information that is conditionally uncorre-
lated.23 This set of assumptions, although common in the literature, is important for
our results. The following discussion outlines how our results would change if we
have allowed for alternative information structures.
7.1. Observe the fundamental directly
We first consider a case in which agents can pay attention to observe both the funda-
mental directly and a noisy public signal about the fundamental. Interestingly, this
scenario is a special case in our benchmark model, in which the variance of the noise
contained in the private signal σ2x is 0. In this case, the relative accuracy of the public
20When the precision of the public signal is high enough, agents pay all their attention to the public
signal. In this situation, an increase in the precision of the public signal is always welfare-enhancing.
21The rational inattention model characterized by Myatt and Wallace (2012) allows agents to learn
one noisy signal about the fundamental that contains exogenous sender’s noise. They explicitly specify
a cost function without studying the attention allocation problem, which is the focus of this paper.
22Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) adopt the same set of assumptions, but they have a different spec-
ification for the way agents reduce the observation nosies. In their work, they allow agents to pay a
fixed cost to obtain a noisy signal of the fundamental, which reduces the variance of the observation
noise from infinity to zero. In contrast, we allow agents to choose the variance of the observation noises
by spending capacity on those signals. Furthermore, the cost function of acquiring information is also
different in their work.
23Private information can be interpreted alternatively. In an example of an island economy, island-
level productivity can be a noisy signal about the aggregate productivity. Firms can obtain a noisy signal
about local productivity by paying attention to it. The island-specific component, i.e., the difference
between idiosyncratic island productivity and aggregate productivity, corresponds to the sender’s noise
in the private signal in our model. An increase in attention to the island-level productivity only reduces
the observation noise.
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signal takes an extreme value ∇ = ρ. (Recall that ∇ is always bounded by ρ and 1/ρ.)
Two results arise from this extreme case. First, spending all of the endowed ca-
pacity on observing the fundamental directly is always an equilibrium and socially
optimal.24 Intuitively, to estimate the fundamental θ, spending capacity to observe θ
directly is always more efficient than learning a noisy signal z about it, in terms of
reducing the observation noises. At the limit, when agents process an infinite amount
of capacity, they only want to spend the capacity to observe θ, in which case they
can obtain the value of the fundamental. From the perspective of society, obtaining a
clearer signal about the fundamental and discarding the public signal entirely is also
the optimum, given that coordination is socially costly.
Second, agents may also coordinate on an inefficient equilibrium, in which every-
body pays all his attention to the public signal and does not observe the fundamental
at all. That case arises, only when the coordination motive is sufficiently strong, i.e.,
(1 +
√
1− ρ2)/2 < α < 1 and the total capacity is not too large or too small.25 The
intuition is also not so different from the reason why multiple equilibria emerge in the
benchmark case (discussed in Section 3.4).26
7.2. Observe two public signals
The assumption that the two information sources are of different publicity is important
for our results. To highlight its effect, in this section we investigate an alternative
setting where the two signals are both public but differ only in precision.27
Some results from this case are the same as those from our benchmark model. First,
in this case, agents focus on the relatively more precise signal when the capacity avail-
able is rather small and diversify when it is very large. Second, it is also the case that
multiple equilibria may emerge, when capacity is in the intermediate range. The intu-
itions gained from our benchmark model can be applied to explain these two results.
However, in this setting, it is not possible that agents pay full attention to the less
accurate signal and ignore the relatively more precise one, unless multiple equilibria
exist. In other words, the key mechanism of attention mis-allocation in our benchmark
24In other words, it holds that γ(0,0) < 1 for any κˆ.
25In this case, even though∇ takes the smallest possible value ρ, it is still possible that∇1 <∇= ρ<
∇0. Recall that both∇1 and ∇0 vary in κˆ. In this case, ∇ˆ, that is, the minimum of ∇1, is smaller than ρ.
See Figure 6(e) for an illustration of the attention allocation pattern, when ∇ = ρ.
26When the strategic concern is strong, agent i is severely punished for deviating from the strategy
of observing the public signal only, on the condition that everyone else adopts this strategy. To ensure
that it is an equilibrium, the amount of capacity available cannot be too large; otherwise it is too costly
for agent i to follow this strategy, that is, spending capacity on observing fundamental directly is more
efficient in terms of learning θ. The amount of capacity cannot be too small either; otherwise the effect
of relative accuracy dominates and agent i chooses to deviate.
27We can provide a full characterization of this case upon request.
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model does not exist in this setting. Intuitively, if one of the signals is private and
more precise and the other is public but less precise, it can be the case that agents may
decrease their attention to, or totally ignore, the more precise private signal when the
available capacity increases, because the desire of coordination dominates the effect of
diminishing returns and relative accuracy. However, in the case of two public signals,
that cannot be the case because both signals are public and can help coordinate agents’
actions. Therefore, agents either pay full attention to the more precise public signal
(when the effect of relative accuracy dominates), or divide their attention between the
two public signals (when the effect of diminishing returns dominates).
8. Conclusion
There has been a recent surge of interest in modeling information acquisition and the
endogenous information structure in macroeconomic environments. See Veldkamp
(2011) for a textbook treatment on this topic and Hellwig, Kohls, and Veldkamp (2012)
for an excellent review. However, fewer studies have touched on the welfare impli-
cations of information acquisition in this class of economies. This study focuses ex-
clusively on a range of welfare issues in beauty contest models, in a context where
agents are rationally inattentive and therefore optimally allocate a limited amount of
attention between correlated private and public signals.
We fully characterize the sufficient and necessary conditions for the equilibrium
uniqueness and multiplicity, and show that the attention allocation and the number of
signals that agents decide to observe are not necessarily monotonic, in response to the
increase in the capacity of processing information. Unlike the literature, we also high-
light the role of the correlation between two signals, which critically affects the equi-
librium uniqueness and multiplicity, along with the welfare properties in this model.
Further, we show that in this setting, when capacity increases, the social welfare of this
economy may not necessarily increase. In fact, it can decrease as a result of attention
misallocation. Interestingly, social welfare can be even higher when agents possess a
finite amount of capacity than when they have an infinite amount of capacity.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. First, we solve for the weighting rule adopted by all of the other
agents, on the condition that their attention allocation is (κˆ∗x, κˆ∗z ):
Π∗x =
φ∗x
φ∗x + φ∗z + φ∗θ
, Π∗z =
φ∗z
φ∗x + φ∗z + φ∗θ
, Π∗θ =
φ∗θ
φ∗x + φ∗z + φ∗θ
,
where
φ∗x =
1
σ2x + (ω
∗
x)
2 , φ
∗
z =
1
(1− α)σ2z + (ω∗z )2
, φ∗θ =
1
(1− α)σ2 ,
and
ω∗x =
√
(σ2x + σ
2) (1− ρ2)
exp (2κˆ∗x)− 1
, ω∗z =
√
(σ2z + σ
2) (1− ρ2)
exp (2κˆ∗z )− 1
.
Second, we solve for the optimal action rule for agent i, i.e., (Π∗z,i,Π
∗
x,i,Π
∗
θ,i), condi-
tional on the others’ allocation strategy (κˆ∗x, κˆ∗z ) and his own (κˆx,i, κˆz,i). It is the solution
to the following optimization problem,
max
Πx,i,Πz,i,Πθ,i
E [ui] s.t.
(
κˆz,j, κˆx,j
)
= (κˆ∗z , κˆ∗x) for all j 6= i,
where E [ui] is given by equation (14). First order conditions imply that
Π∗x,i =Π
∗
x +
(
c1Π∗θ − c2Π∗x
)
(c1 + c5 + c3 + c4)−
(
c1Π∗θ − c3Π∗z
)
(c1 + c5)
(c1 + c5 + c2) (c1 + c5 + c3 + c4)− (c1 + c5)2
, (23)
Π∗z,i =Π
∗
z +
(
c1Π∗θ − c3Π∗z
)
(c1 + c5 + c2)−
(
c1Π∗θ − c2Π∗x
)
(c1 + c5)
(c1 + c5 + c2) (c1 + c5 + c3 + c4)− (c1 + c5)2
. (24)
where
c1 = (1− α)σ2, c2 = σ2x +ω2x,i, c3 = (1− α)σ2z +ω2z,i,
c4 = ασ2z , c5 = ασ
2.
Therefore, the relative marginal return of attention on the public signal γ can be re-
written by replacing Π∗x,i and Π
∗
z,i with (23) and (24).
γ =
[
C1 exp (2κˆz,i) + C2 exp (2κˆ)
C3 exp (2κˆz,i) + C4
]2 1
∇2 exp (2κˆ) .
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where
C1 = [(1− α)Π∗θ + (1− α)Π∗z +Π∗x] (1−∇ρ) ,
C2 = α
(
1
ρ2
− 1
)
Π∗z + [(1− α)Π∗θ + (1− α)Π∗z +Π∗x]
(∇
ρ
− 1
)
,
C3 = [(1− α)Π∗θ + (1− α)Π∗z +Π∗x]
(
1
∇ρ − 1
)
,
C4 = α
(
1
∇ρ −
ρ
∇
)
Π∗z + [(1− α)Π∗θ + (1− α)Π∗z +Π∗x]
(
1− ρ∇
)
.
Therefore, we can show
∂γ (κˆz,i, κˆ∗z )
∂κˆz,i
< 0,
∂γ (κˆz,i, κˆ∗z )
∂∇ > 0,
∂γ (κˆz,i, κˆ∗z )
∂α
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. The first part of Lemma 1 implies that the best response of
agent i to the allocation strategy adopted by others is unique. Therefore, the allocation
(κˆx, κˆz) = (κˆ,0) constitutes a symmetric equilibrium if and only if γ(0,0) < 1. That is,
∇≤ exp (κˆ)ρ+ 1
exp (κˆ) + ρ
≡∇0.
Similarly, the allocation (κˆx, κˆz) = (0, κˆ) constitutes a symmetric equilibrium if and
only if γ(κˆ, κˆ) > 1. That is,
∇≥ (1− α) (exp(2κˆ)− 1) +
(
1− ρ2)
(1− α) (exp(2κˆ)− 1)ρ+ exp(κˆ) (1− ρ2) ≡∇1.
A symmetric equilibrium with diversification must be such that κˆ∗z ∈ (0, κˆ) and it
exists if and only if γ (κˆ∗z , κˆ∗z ) = 1 where we have
γ (κˆ∗z , κˆ∗z ) =
((
∇
ρ − 1
)
(exp(2κˆ)− exp(2κˆ∗z )) +∇
(
1
ρ − ρ
)
exp(2κˆ∗z )
)2
exp(2κˆ)
(
(1− α)
(
1
ρ −∇
)
(exp(2κˆ∗z )− 1) +
(
1
ρ − ρ
))2 . (25)
Such an equilibrium arises if
∇ ∈ (min{∇0,∇1},max{∇0,∇1}) .
The optimal allocation is given by (18). Obviously, the equilibrium must be unique, if
∇0 <∇1, which also implies α< 1− ρexp(κˆ) . In other words, multiple equilibria emerge
if and only if the condition (20) holds.
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Figure 6. Patterns of bounds ∇0 and ∇1.
Proof of Proposition 2. When κˆ is sufficiently large, ∇1 monotonically increases and
limκˆ→+∞∇1 = 1ρ while ∇0 monotonically decreases and limκˆ→+∞∇0 = ρ. Therefore,
for any∇, when κˆ is sufficiently large, it holds that∇∈ (∇0,∇1). According to Propo-
sition 1, the equilibrium is unique and 0 < κˆ∗z < κˆ. Further, the last part of this propo-
sition can be obtained from equation (18).
Proof of Proposition 3. The complete characterization of the equilibrium attention al-
location can be summarized in the following claims.
Claim 1: If the relative accuracy is sufficiently low (i.e., ∇ < ∇ˆ), agents specialize
in learning the private signal and then eventually diversify their attention when the
capacity increases, where
∇ˆ = 1
ρ
− 1
ρ
1
2
√
α(1−α)
(1−ρ2) ρ+
2(1−α)
(1−ρ2) ρ
2 + 1
;
κˆ∗z /κˆ can be either monotonically increasing or hump-shaped.
Proof. We first establish some properties of∇0 and∇1. As illustrated in Figure 6, there
are in total five patterns, according to the combinations of α and ρ. For any κˆ > 0, the
bounds ∇0 and ∇1 can be characterized as follows,
1. limκˆ→+∞∇0 = ρ and limκˆ→+∞∇1 = 1/ρ.
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2. ∇0(0) =∇1(0) = 1.
3. ∇0 monotonically decreases in κˆ.
4. ∇1 may or may not be monotone:
(i) If 0 < α < 1−ρ2 , ∇1 monotonically increases in κˆ. Otherwise, ∇1 decreases
and then increases, reaching the trough at κˆ = ˆˆκ, where
ˆˆκ = ln
(
ρ+
√
α (1− ρ2)/ (1− α)
)
.
(ii) If 1−ρ2 < α < 1− ρ, ∇1 is always larger than ∇0 for any κˆ.
(iii) If 1− ρ< α,∇0 and∇1 cross only once at κˆ= ln
( ρ
1−α
)
, on the condition that
κˆ is positive. Further, ∇1 is smaller than ∇0 if and only if κˆ < ln( ρ1−α ).
(iv) If 1− ρ< α< 1− ρ2,∇0 and∇1 cross on the left side of ˆˆκ; if 1− ρ2 < α< 1,
they cross on the right side of ˆˆκ.
We can show the first three items by using the expression in equation (19). The last
item can be verified by noting that,
d∇1
dκˆ
∝ (1− α)exp(2κˆ)− 2 (1− α)ρexp(κˆ) + ρ2 − α.
Denote ∇ˆ ≡ ∇1
( ˆˆκ) and ∇˜ ≡ ∇1 (ln( ρ1−α)), we obtain
∇ˆ = 1
ρ
− 1
ρ
1
2
√
α(1−α)
(1−ρ2) ρ+
2(1−α)
(1−ρ2) ρ
2 + 1
; ∇˜ = 1
ρ
− 1
ρ
α
(
1− ρ2)
1− (1− α)2 .
Intuitively, ∇ˆ is the minimum of ∇1 and ∇˜ is such that ∇˜ = ∇1
(
ln
( ρ
1−α
))
=
∇0
(
ln
( ρ
1−α
))
. If ∇ ∈ (ρ,∇ˆ), it holds that ∇ < ∇1 for any κˆ; and there exists a cut-
off κˆ0, such that for any κˆ ∈ (0, κˆ0), ∇ <∇0 and for any κˆ ≥ κˆ0, ∇ ≥∇0. According to
Proposition 1, the first part of this Claim is shown.
Regarding the pattern of attention allocation κˆ∗z /κˆ, it can be categorized in the fol-
lowing two cases:
1. When the coordination motive is not so high, i.e., 0 < α < 1− ρ, κˆ∗z /κˆ is mono-
tonically increasing in κˆ, if ∇ <∇, where ∇ = [ρ+ (1− α)]/[(1− α)ρ+ 1]; and
is hump-shaped in κˆ, if ∇ <∇ < 1.
2. When the coordination motive is high, i.e., 1− ρ < α, κˆ∗z /κˆ is hump-shaped in κˆ,
if ∇ <∇ <min{∇˜,∇ˆ}; and is monotonically increasing in κˆ, if ∇ <∇.
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The details of the proof of the above two cases are contained in the Technical Ap-
pendix.
Claim 2: Suppose the coordination motive is strong, i.e., (1− ρ)/2< α≤ 1− ρ, and
the relative accuracy is not extremely high, i.e., ∇ˆ < ∇ < 1. Agents re-allocate their
attention in the following fashion. When capacity is low, they specialize in learning
the private signal only, then diversify their attention allocation and then specialize in
learning the public signal only before eventually diversifying again.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Claim 1. See Figure 6(b) for illustration.
Claim 3: Suppose the coordination motive is very strong, i.e., 1− ρ < α < 1, and
the relative accuracy is not extremely high, i.e., ∇˜ ≤ ∇ < 1. Agents re-allocate their
attention in the following fashion. When the capacity is sufficiently low, they focus
only on the private signal. When the capacity is higher, they may coordinate on one
of the three equilibria. When there is a further increase in capacity, they pay attention
only to the public signal. And when the capacity is sufficiently high, they eventually
diversify.
Proof. We show that ∇˜< 1 if and only if ρ> 1− α. The proof is similar to that of Claim
1. See Figure 6(c), (d) and (e) for illustration.
Claim 4: Suppose the coordination motive is very strong, i.e., 1− ρ < α ≤ 1, and
the relative accuracy is low, i.e., max{ρ,∇ˆ} ≤ ∇ < ∇˜. If 1 − ρ < α ≤ 1 − ρ2, they
allocate their attention in the same fashion as that in Claim 2. If 1− ρ2 < α ≤ 1, when
capacity is low, agents specialize in learning the private signal only. When the capacity
is higher, they may coordinate on one of the three equilibria. When there is a further
increase in capacity, they pay attention only to the private signal again. And when the
capacity is sufficiently high, they eventually diversify. Note that ρ < ∇ˆ, if and only if
α < (1+
√
1− ρ2)/2.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Claim 1. See Figure 6(d) and (e) for illustration.
Proof of Lemma 2. This proof offers a sufficient condition under which Lemma 2 holds.
We consider the following two cases: (i) 2α+ ρ > 1, (1− α)exp(κˆ) > ρ and ∇ < 1; (ii)
α+ ρ > 1 and ∇ < ∇ˆ. Under these two cases, if κˆ > κˆ0, 0 ≤ κˆ∗x < κˆ. Therefore, we can
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show,
dκˆ∗x
dκˆ
∝ (∇− ρ) (1− α)exp(2κˆ)−
[(
1− ρ2
)
− (1− ρ∇) (1− α)
]
(1− α)exp(κˆ)
− ((1− α)exp(κˆ)− ρ)
[(
1− ρ2
)
− (1− α) (1−∇ρ)
]
<
[
(∇− ρ)exp(κˆ)−
(
1− ρ2
)
+ (1− ρ∇) (1− α)
]
(1− α)exp(κˆ).
Therefore, dκˆ∗x/dκˆ < 0, if
[
(∇− ρ)exp(κˆ)− (1− ρ2)+ (1− ρ∇) (1− α)] < 0. This
holds true, if
1−∇ρ
∇− ρ < exp(κˆ) <
(
1− ρ2)− (1− ρ∇) (1− α)
∇− ρ .
The first inequality must hold so that κˆ > κˆ0. The second inequality can hold on the
condition that α is sufficiently large; that is,
α > 1−
(
1− ρ2)
(1− ρ∇) .
Proof of Proposition 4. A simple calculation leads to
d∇1
dρ
=
(exp (2κˆ)− 1) (1− α) [− (1− α) (exp (2κˆ)− 1) + 2ρexp (κˆ)− (1+ ρ2)]
[(1− α) (exp (2κˆ)− 1)ρ+ exp (κˆ) (1− ρ2)]2
.
Let T1 = − (1− α) (exp (2κˆ)− 1) + 2ρexp (κˆ) −
(
1+ ρ2
)
. If and only if ρ < (1 −
α)exp (κˆ), T1 decreases in κˆ and T1 < 0. In other words, d∇1/dρ < 0 for any κˆ >
ln(ρ/(1− α)). This implies that κˆ1 increases in ρ. Similarly, we can show that∇0 is an
increasing function of ρ, and therefore κˆ0 increases in ρ.
Let l(κˆ) be the difference between the expected utility of adopting the strategy
κˆ∗z = κˆ and that of κˆ∗z = 0, when condition (20) holds. The cutoff κˆs is such that l(κˆs) = 0.
It implies that κˆ∗z = κˆ if and only if
l(κˆ) =
[
1+
(1− ρ2)
exp(2κˆ)− 1
]
∇2 − αρ∇−
[ (
1− ρ2)
exp(2κˆ)− 1 + (1− α)
]
> 0.
Under this circumstance, it is straightforward to show the following facts: l(κˆ) is
strictly increasing in κˆ, limκˆ→0 l(κˆ) < 0 and limκˆ→+∞ l(κˆ) > 0. Therefore, there is a
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unique κˆs > 0, such that l(κˆs) = 0, where
κˆs = ln
(√
(1− ρ2) (1−∇2)
α (1− ρ∇)− (1−∇2) + 1
)
.
By noting that κˆs decreases in ρ, this proposition is shown.
Proof of Proposition 5. We show that social welfare can be decreasing in the case
where α + ρ > 1 and ∇˜ < ∇ < 1. If κˆ∗z = 0 or κˆ∗z = κˆ, social welfare is calculated by
the following
E [W s] = −
1+ (1− α) φxφθ(
φx
φθ
+ 1
)2
σ2,
E [W s] = −
1+ (1− α) φzφθ(
φz
φθ
+ 1
)2
σ2 − α
(
φz
φθ
)2
(
φz
φθ
+ 1
)2σ2z ,
when κˆ < κˆs, κˆ∗z = 0 and dE [W (a,θ)]/dκˆ > 0. To see this, we notice that φx increases
in κˆ and E [W s] increases in φx,
dE [W s]
dφx
=
σ2
[
(1+ α) + (1− α) φxφθ
]
(
1+ φxφθ
)3
φθ
> 0.
Similarly, when κˆs < κˆ < κˆ1, κˆ∗z = κˆ and social welfare increases in κˆ. When κˆ = κˆs,
agents are indifferent of specialization in private or public signals, which implies that
φx = φz, and social welfare discontinuously decreases at κˆ = κˆs. Because E [W s] mono-
tonically increases in κˆ, when κˆ < κˆs, there must exist κˆa and κˆb such that E [W s(κˆa)]>
E [W s(κˆb)] and κˆa < κˆs < κˆb.
Proof of Proposition 6. Except in the case where α + ρ > 1 and ∇˜ < ∇ < 1, we can
show that κˆ∗x = κˆ0 and κˆ∗z = 0, when κˆ = κˆ0. To show E [W s(κˆ0)] > E [Wms], we only
need to show f ≡ E [W s(κˆ0)]− E [Wms] > 0, where
f =
1(
ρ
(∇−ρ) +
1
(1−α)(1−∇ρ)
) − α ρ(∇−ρ)(
ρ
(∇−ρ) +
1
(1−α)(1−∇ρ)
)2
− 1(
ρ(1−∇2)
(1−ρ∇)(∇−ρ) +
1
1−α
) − α ρ(1−∇
2)
(1−ρ∇)(∇−ρ)(
ρ(1−∇2)
(1−ρ∇)(∇−ρ) +
1
1−α
)2 .
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To provide a sufficient condition under which the inequality holds, we denote
f (α) = f1 (α) + f2 (α) ,
where
f1 (α) =
(
1
1− ρ∇ − 1
)
(1− α)2
(
−α2 + 4α− 2
)( ρ
∇− ρ
)2
f2 (α) =
(1− α)2 ρ∇
1− ρ∇
[(
1
1− ρ∇ − 1
)
(α− 2)2 + 2
(
1
1− ρ∇ − 1
)2
− 2− 1
1− ρ∇
(2− α)2
(1− α)2
]
f1 (α) > 0 if and only if −α2 + 4α − 2 > 0, or α > 2−
√
2. When ∇ is sufficiently
low and close to ρ, ρ∇−ρ can be arbitrarily large and
1
1−ρ∇ is close to a constant
1
1−ρ2 .
Therefore, f1 (α) can be arbitrarily large and f2 (α) is close to a constant. Moreover, it
must hold that ρ < (1− α)exp(κˆ0) or,
(1− α)
ρ
>
∇− ρ
1− ρ∇ .
This holds when ∇ is low enough.
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Technical Appendix
(Not intended for publication)
Proof of Proposition 3, Part 2 of Claim 1. The following lemma is particularly useful
for our characterization.
Lemma 3. When the equilibrium is unique, the fraction of attention paid to the public
signal, i.e., κˆ∗z /κˆ, strictly increases in κˆ if and only if 0< κˆ∗z /κˆ < 1 and
κˆ∗z
κˆ
− F (κˆ) < 0, (26)
where
F ≡1
2
+
1
2
T
(1− α) (1− ρ∇) (∇− ρ) ·
1
1− (1−ρ2)−(1−α)(1−ρ∇)
(∇−ρ)exp(κˆ)
· 1
exp (κˆ)− ρ1−α
,
T =(1− ρ∇)α [(1− ρ∇) (1− α)− ρ (∇− ρ)] .
Proof. We re-write equation (18) as follows,
κˆ∗z
κˆ
=
1
2
+
1
2 ln
[
(1−α)(1−ρ∇)+(∇−ρ)exp(κˆ)−(1−ρ2)
(1−α)(1−ρ∇)exp(κˆ)+(∇−ρ)−∇(1−ρ2)
]
ln [exp (κˆ)]
. (27)
Derive its derivative with respect to exp(κˆ) and we find that ∂(κˆ∗z /κˆ)/∂exp (κˆ) > 0 if
and only if the condition (26) holds.
We first show that in the case of ∇ > 1, κˆ∗z /κˆ monotonically decreases in κˆ, when
κˆ > κˆ1. There are three sub-cases.
Case 1: α < 1− ρ and ∇ ∈
(
1−α+ρ2
(1−α)ρ+ρ ,
1
ρ
)
. We can verify that T < 0 and further
0> ln
(
ρ
1− α
)
> ln
((
1− ρ2)− (1− α) (1− ρ∇)
∇− ρ
)
,
which implies that F (κˆ) is strictly increasing and approaches 1/2 from below when κˆ
approaches +∞.
We can also show that κˆ∗z /κˆ approaches 1/2 from above, because the second term
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in (27) is positive when κˆ approaches +∞, i.e.,
lim
κˆ→+∞
ln
[
(1− α) (1− ρ∇) + (∇− ρ)exp (κˆ)− (1− ρ2)
(1− α) (1− ρ∇)exp (κˆ) + (∇− ρ)−∇ (1− ρ2)
]
= ln
[ ∇− ρ
(1− α) (1− ρ∇)
]
> 0.
Further, the first part of Proposition 3 implies that limκˆ→κˆ+1 κˆ
∗
z /κˆ= 1. We can show that
κˆ∗z /κˆ − F (κˆ) > 0, for any κˆ > κˆ1, by constructing a contradiction. Suppose there exists
κˆ′ such that κˆ∗z (κˆ′)/κˆ′< F(κˆ′). Lemma 3 implies that it must hold that κˆ∗z /κˆ approaches
1/2 from below. A contradiction. This fact further implies that κˆ∗z /κˆ monotonically
decreases, by using Lemma 3 again.
Case 2: α < 1− ρ and ∇ ∈
(
1, 1−α+ρ
2
(1−α)ρ+ρ
)
. In this case, we can show that F (κˆ) is
strictly decreasing and approaches 1/2 from above, when κˆ approaches +∞. Further,
it must hold that F(κˆ1) ≤ 1, that is because κˆ∗z /κˆ must decrease, when κˆ is slightly
higher than κˆ1, according to the first part of Proposition 3.
Similar to the previous case, Lemma 3 implies that κˆ∗z /κˆ − F (κˆ) cannot cross zero
from above; that is, κˆ∗z /κˆ − F (κˆ) > 0 for any κˆ > κˆ1. In other words, κˆ∗z /κˆ decreases
monotonically.
Case 3: The proof for the case where α > 1− ρ and ∇ > 1 is similar.
We then establish that κˆ∗z /κˆ can be either monotonically increasing or hump-shaped
when ∇ < 1.
Case 1: α < 1− ρ and ∇ ∈ (ρ,∇). In this case, we can show that F(κˆ) is mono-
tonically decreasing and approaches 1/2 from above. The first part of Proposition
3 implies that limκˆ→κˆ+0 κˆ
∗
z /κˆ = 0. Under this case, κˆ∗z /κˆ approaches 1/2 from below
because the second term in (27) is negative when κˆ approaches +∞, i.e.,
lim
κˆ→+∞
ln
[
(1− α) (1− ρ∇) + (∇− ρ)exp (κˆ)− (1− ρ2)
(1− α) (1− ρ∇)exp (κˆ) + (∇− ρ)−∇ (1− ρ2)
]
= ln
[ ∇− ρ
(1− α) (1− ρ∇)
]
< 0.
Using similar arguments in previous cases, we can show that κˆ∗z /κˆ monotonically in-
creases in κˆ.
Case 2: α ∈ (0,1− ρ) and ∇ ∈ (∇,1). This case differs from the previous one in
that κˆ∗z /κˆ approaches 1/2 from above when κˆ → +∞. Therefore, Lemma 3 implies
that κˆ∗z /κˆ must be increasing and then decreasing, i.e., it is hump-shaped.
The proofs of the remaining cases are also similar.
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